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In this paper I argue for a merological anthropology in which ideas of ‘partiality’ and 
‘practical adequacy’ provide a way out of the impasse of relativism which is implied by post-
modernism and the related abandonment of a concern with ‘truth’. Ideas such as ‘aptness’ 
and ‘faithfulness’ enable us to re-establish empirical foundations without having to espouse a 
simple realism which has been rightly criticised. Ideas taken from ethnomethodology, 
particularly the way we bootstrap from ‘practical adequacy’ to ‘warrants for confidence’ 
point to a merological anthropology in which we recognize that we do not and cannot know 
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Understanding Anthropological Understanding: for a merological anthropology  
 
Ethnographic truths are thus inherently partial  committed and incomplete. This point is 
now widely asserted  and resisted at strategic points by those who fear the collapse of 
clear standards of verification. But once accepted and built into ethnographic art, a 
rigorous sense of partiality can be a source of representational tact. Clifford 1986:7  
It seems clear that visual anthropology now urgently needs to consolidate itself within a 
theoretical  framework that reassesses anthropological objectives.  A fuller use of the 
properties of the visual media will entail significant additions to how anthropologists 
define their ways of knowing, which is to say that categories of anthropological 
knowledge will have to be seriously rethought, both in relation to science and to the 
representational systems of film, video and photography. (MacDougall 1997: 286) 
Eliminating simple minded realism does not eliminate all forms of realism, and it does 
not require either idealism or total relativism. (Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 233) 
 
Introduction 
Some recent papers in Anthropological Theory (e.g. Hastrup 2004 and Csordas 2004) have raised 
a series of epistemological questions. What is anthropological knowledge? What sorts of 
evidence do we, should we be addressing? How does evidence contribute to knowledge? On 
what grounds might we be led to reconsider our position? Rather than accept the postmodern 
rejection of empiricism as ‘positivistic’ I shall argue that there is room for an empirically 
warranted ontology and following this an epistemology (a form of sophisticated realism) in 
which a recalcitrant world constrains but does not determine what people make of it, in ways in 
which people (including anthropologists) can comprehend.  
Parts/Wholes or from Partial Views to Partiality and Merology 
I start with some fundamental questions. What happens if we change our basic vocabulary? What 
else will change? How does the terrain of anthropology differ once redescribed? Inspirations for 
this starting point include Marilyn Strathern on parts and wholes (and hence how individuals 
relate to society, see Strathern 1992a), Tim Ingold on song as the basis for language (1993, 2000) 
and Alfred Gell on connections between phonetics and landscape (1995). 
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Tim Ingold has suggested (at least half-seriously) that singing rather than tool making 
should be seen as the significant step in human evolution.1 He asks a curious and fascinating 
question:- what if human language starts with song not speech? If we work on that assumption 
then some problems vanish and others appear. The conduit metaphor, the communication of 
information, is no longer an organising principle (if it ever was); rhythm, repetition and syncope 
emerge as basic organising principles.2 The combination of music and movement as ‘dance’ may 
indeed be a prime candidate for human essence. Some recent theoretical work that started from 
the detailed analysis of dance provides some intriguing pointers that this is not as far fetched as it 
may seem at first (Farnell 1999, 2000). Indeed, this provides a new perspective from which to 
approach some of Maurice Bloch’s early work on rhetoric and politics (1975). 
The change of perspective is illuminating, it helps reveal the refraction patterns of the 
analytic terms we are accustomed to using. It helps us to think through the biases implicit in our 
starting points. 
My other examples are Melanesian in origin. Marilyn Strathern has questioned the 
relationship of individuals to society. She used Melanesian case material as the basis for a re-
examination of the Durkheimian axiom that individual people are the atoms of the social 
universe, the building blocks from which society is composed (this is further discussed below). 
In a very different way Alfred Gell (1995) upset and disturbed assumptions that are usually never 
questioned, by raising the possibility of connections between phonetics and landscape (landscape 
affecting phonology not the other way round). He suggested ways in which the shape of the 
tongue as it produces particular syllables resembles the shape of the landscape features named by 
the phonemes concerned. Gell made us question the independence of cultural features such as 
language in new and provocative ways. Gell is not usually seen as a material determinist but he 
                                                           
1 I am conscious that Ingold is mainly arguing against stepwise leaps in evolution. Here I am less concerned with 
evolutionary theory than in using his argument to explore the effects of changing the initial conceptual metaphors 
used in anthropological theory making. 
2 It is worth noting that according to the anthropologically inspired ‘Darkover’ series of science fiction novels of 
Marion Zimmer Baddley ‘to dance is human’. 
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would have (I am sure) enjoyed the game or the posture. He would have appreciated that cultural 
materialists such as Marvin Harris have something to teach us, so that by acting like a materialist 
one day and a structuralist another we are better able to comprehend and discuss the matter with 
which we are dealing. 
This style of questioning, whether about the fundamental building blocks and their 
independence from one another, or about the ways that parts and wholes are related, leads to 
some other questions about anthropology and anthropological theorising, and it is to these that 
we now turn. 
Partiality and Partial views 
My question is the following: what if the point of anthropology is not to produce a synoptic view 
of everything?3 Anthropological holism not withstanding, what if we accept our limitations and 
start thinking seriously and positively about partial views, and about incompleteness.4  This 
produces a merological5 anthropology)?  At a stroke several concerns slip away: most 
importantly, rival interpretations no longer directly compete, instead they (potentially) 
complement one another.  Although where they overlap they may compete, most often this is not 
the case. As a case in point, consider Mark Hobart’s condemnation of the discipline in which his 
career was made.  ‘The fact that laughter, fear, indeed so much of what people actually do and 
say, are so successfully eliminated or trivialised in most anthropological writings is a pretty 
                                                           
3 In this context ‘everything’ is a weasel word. The argument I construct is couched in the language of 
epistemology: of the limitations of human knowledge of an independent world. If the ontology is somewhat 
different, so that rather than thinking of a complete world, independent of human thought, we think of a processual 
world in a continual state of becoming, then necessarily all human knowledge is, and always will be, incomplete, 
since the process never finishes. 
4 This is Reyna’s approach (1997: 332-4, and 347): his agniological method seeks to identify (and then reduce), our 
ignorance, so he urges us to look for gaps and holes. This I note is likely to be humbling for the practitioners. 
5 The term mereology is used in philosophy as a term for the ‘formal study of the relations between parts and 
wholes’ (OED2). This is particularly relevant to Durkheimian questions about the relation between individuals and 
society, and those between persons, body parts and memories (see Chisholm 1979 and Ruben 1983). As I will argue 
below, merological anthropology is an anthropology which is partial and honest about its partialities. In another 
context Strathern (1992b: 72, 204) introduces the idea of merographics (partial analogies): ‘the issue is the way  
ideas write or describe one another,; the very act of description makes what is being described  a part of something 
else e.g. the description’ (1992b: 204); see also Franklin’s recent elaboration (2003). The philosopher John Dilworth 
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damming indictment of our pretensions to knowledge’ (1995: 66). I suggest that this is not an 
indictment but a humbling reminder of how partial our knowledge is, knowledge which is none 
the worse for all that. The recognition of incompleteness is not, to my mind, an indictment but 
rather the following. First: humbling (we do not and can not know everything). Second, it is a 
necessary consequence of a scientific orientation, or as Hastrup puts it ‘knowledge must be 
organized information; in the case of anthropology it concerns the organized information about 
ways of living in the world and modes of attending to the world. The organization implies that 
knowledge is both reductive and selective’ (2004: 456 her emphasis). Third, incompleteness 
leaves room for multiple other accounts so it should underline the way that an anthropological 
account does not claim exclusivity; it occupies a demarcated domain, the boundaries of which 
are continually being challenged and shown to have been misunderstood (but this is a symptom 
of a progressive discipline). We do know more than we once did. That makes our lives 
considerably harder than those of some of our illustrious predecessors. Moreover, different 
accounts (and tensions between them) may help explain some of the dynamics of social 
structure. Bateson’s original account of Naven (1980) exemplifies this: his subtitle is ‘a 
composite picture of the culture of a New Guinea tribe drawn from three points of view’. Each 
viewpoint he presents illuminates different aspects of the ritual and Iatmul society yet they are 
admittedly incomplete in themselves. Finally, mention of dynamics brings us to the temporal 
dimension (for all that Bateson’s account is synchronic). Although I write from an 
epistemological starting point (as if the problem were imperfect knowledge of a fully defined 
world), recognizing incompleteness leaves room for other ontologies as well. In particular, it is 
consistent with a view of the world as processual, or as continually becoming. 
The word partial is ambiguous between being 1) incomplete or 2) biased. As I shall 
explain below, both meanings are relevant to anthropology. First, consider the following 
(invented) statements which are typical of much published academic work, anthropology 
                                                                                                                                                                                              




The truth about Diana’s death is x.   
They said it was like that but what really happened was this...   
Dr W. gives a detailed and accurate account of social life among the Blah.   
 
Even those most enthused by postmodernism do not succeed in escaping from implicit 
references to truth. A relativist has no reason to complain about other peoples’ concerns about 
truthful accounts or accurate representations and should eschew such complaints as misleading 
or imperialist (in other words, they have no basis for attempting to impose their relativism on 
realist others without recourse to claims to truth or some other form of implicit realism). 
I suggest that anthropologists should aspire to producing faithful6 accounts, in which the 
partiality of their accounts are made explicit, and in which the practitioners take steps to reduce 
that partiality; the recognition that it cannot be completely avoided does not mean that we cannot 
attempt minimization. The inevitability of bias does not prevent a professional anthropologist 
seeking to document partiality when it occurs. This applies to both our own partiality and those 
of our informants. Hence, standard sociological research techniques are helpful, providing 
warrants for our statements. Following these methods anthropologists are systematic.  They do 
not believe everything they are told, or, rather, they listen to everything everyone tells them and 
then try and make sense of the conflicts (and the contradictions) between what different people 
say, and between what people say and what they do. 
So we attempt to be faithful, to what we are told and to ourselves, to our professional 
identities as observers and as social analysts.  Unattainable? Yes.  Inevitably tainted? Certainly! 
But ‘orientation’ is different from ‘arrival’ or ‘achievement’. This connects with the idea of 
                                                           
6 I am conscious that the main text defines neither ‘faithfulness’ nor ‘aptness’. An important part of my argument is 
that such words point to the complexity and entanglement of humans and the world. It is not so much a case of 
humans knowing the world (simple realism) or of constructing  the world they live in (strong relativism), but rather 
humans from particular cultural backgrounds and for particular purposes making sense of an often recalcitrant 
world. It is my contention that the questions raised by the ambiguities of words like ‘faithfulness’ (or ‘aptness’ as 
used below) push us in fruitful directions as we try to make sense of and understand the complexity of human social 
organization (see Reyna (1997: 328ff) on science and objectivity).  
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‘Partial Views’ and the work of Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 160) who describe scientific 
metaphors as being apt7. The notions of aptness or faithfulness provide ways of evaluating 
accounts in the face of the available evidence. Aptness is susceptible to empirical testing. The 
attraction of such an approach, as I see it, is that it assumes that all explanation has a 
metaphorical component which will be culturally constrained: ‘the very notion of the aptness of a 
metaphorical concept requires an embodied realism. Aptness depends on basic-level experience 
and upon a realistic body-based understanding of our environment’ (Lakoff and Johnson 1999: 
72-3 see also 228-32). Yet for all these cultural constraints, aptness also provides a link to 
empiricism: a metaphor may or may not be apt, and we can seek evidence to help us make the 
judgement.  
Somewhat ironically, my point is the same as Clifford’s (1986: 7) for all his being one of 
the most prominent anthropological postmodernists, and hence usually taken as being hostile to 
empiricism. But his talk of ‘representational tact’ in the introduction to Writing Culture (quoted 
above) is wholly consistent with the idea of aptness or empirical responsibility.8 As Brian Morris  
notes  
‘What knowledge as representation does, however, is to make explicit what in fact is 
being affirmed (truths about the world), and acknowledges that all truth is intersubjective 
and thus open to critical scrutiny and possible refutation by other scholars (unlike truths 
which are apparently disclosed through evocation or mystical ‘revelation’ and which we 
are told have no reference at all to any world outside the text). With regard to 
anthropology, this affirmation of truth as representation is particularly important, for 
ethnographic accounts and anthropological theory should  be open to scrutiny by the 
people whose culture and social life is being described and explicated’ (1997: 324). 
 
Anthropology in the streets: Boot-strapping  
‘Part of the post modernist critique of anthropology has been that its methodology has been 
based on the double illusion of the neutral observer and the observable social phenomenon’ 
                                                           
7 See footnote above for definitional issues. 
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(Banks and Morphy 1997: 13). As has just been discussed, for all its illusory nature, the ‘neutral 
observer’ is an ideal worth aspiring to, since it encourages good practice and it makes for work 
that is more accessible for others to use and criticise.  As to the observability of social 
phenomenon I see this worry as a classic case of taking an inability to run as the basis for 
denying the possibility of walking. Leaving philosophical and metaphysical questions of the 
existence of the world aside, at a very crude level, events are observable and patently these 
events constitute the social worlds we make.  Actors observe each other and change their tactics 
and strategies accordingly. Mundane, everyday lives are full of observable events and 
interactions between people and objects. 
The objects are themselves the subjects of study. One of the ironies of late twentieth 
century anthropology was that at the same time that being the object of anthropological study 
was being portrayed as a terrible thing (I paraphrase), there was a resurgence in the study of 
objects; now with a social life (e.g. ed. Appadurai 1986) or as commodities (e.g. ed. Miller 
1997). The irony is that objects emerge as legitimate subjects of study just as humans cease to be 
so. At times it seems that biological anthropology is in a similar position: it is not, it cannot be, 
essentially racist to study biological aspects of human society. Yet to talk about different 
adaptations to local environments over millennia is to court instant rejection as politically 
unsound. Safer by far to ignore and never consider any question where biology is relevant. 
There is an odd distance, disjunction or rupture between what anthropologists are told to 
do (the methodological and ideological strictures which are handed down to students), and what 
they and their tellers do in their everyday life.  What Husserl called the ‘natural attitude’ 
(lifeworld) typifies non-philosophically-sensitive everyday life. By and large, we do not question 
the existence of our children, colleagues, spouses, our cars and bicycles and their mechanics.  
We behave as if utterances have meaning, which even if not always immediately clear, can be 
easily clarified. It appears that such rough and ready, albeit philosophically and methodologically 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
8 See Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 134) on ‘empirically responsible philosophy’. 
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naïve, attitudes are pervasive round the planet.9  In our mundane lives we don’t live in a post-
modern world.  We live in a modern one (or amodern following Latour 1993). To these prosaic 
(but in the light of contemporary theory, bizarrely radical) claims I wish to add one further 
suggestion: that human actors in their everyday life have anthropological understandings of the 
world they live in.  In order to be a competent adult social actor a person must gain some fluency 
in one or more dialects of one or more languages.  In so doing they acquire not just a grammar 
but a social grammar of how the words are to be used and to whom.  They must learn how to 
comport themselves, how to hold their body, which bits to display when and to whom. They 
must learn which parts can be altered by surgery, the insertion of metal, plastic, silicon gel, or 
ink and to whom they should admit this to (the list could be continued). The models of 
understanding that people have of their fellow actors is essentially an anthropological 
understanding albeit unformalised, often unstated and rarely comparative.  If it works on the 
street why not in academe?  The understanding I have of my fellow citizens is imperfect, 
incomplete (partial), and partial to my point of view but it works (more or less).  It is adequate 
for my everyday life, and by achieving that adequacy it passed a kind of test and repeatedly so.  
The challenge for 21st Century Anthropology as I see it, is to abandon the requirements of 
completeness and certainty for what, after Strathern (1992a), I call merological anthropology. 
We should continue to attempt to make explicit the complexity and systematicity, the 
inconsistency, clarity and vagueness of everyday understandings.  The accounts should be 
merological in that they recognise their own partialities; depending on the rhetoric used such 
recognition could be described as either scientific or post-modern. Anthropological accounts are 
partial both in that they are incomplete and that they are biased. 
Grand illusions: Meaning after the fact. Textures of Meaning 
One grand illusion that we should challenge is that we know what we are saying; that we, as 
                                                           
9 Hence the reference to boot-strapping in the section title: we pull ourselves up by our boot straps in ways 
reminiscent of Escher’s impossibly circular drawings.   
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actors have intentions that are meanings. I would rather argue that intentions are different from 
meanings, that the meaning of utterances is an interactional attribute that does not precede the 
utterance and its reception. Intentions (or goals) may be represented in many different ways, 
usually being inferred after the fact on the basis of actions (which include the production of 
utterances). Much confusion has been caused by a technological innovation that has become 
quite widely distributed, especially in recent times: writing. Analysts such as Eisenstein, Ong and 
Goody10 have written extensively about the effects of literacy but here I want to focus on a 
different aspect of how writing presents a misleading model for understanding how meaning is 
created in ordinary human interaction. 
A parallel illusion in economic theory is that of the rational agent, the lonely maximiser. 
In a chilling article in the London Review of Books Donald Mackenzie (2002) reports how 
ordinary students behave normally (that is not according to the norms of economics) except for 
those ‘polluted’ by economic theory who actually act according to its precepts. This has 
terrifying implications since it is the economics graduates who are recruited by important 
agencies such as the World Bank and IMF, so although economic theory was wrong as a model 
of the activity of human agents it may come to be correct as those schooled in its theories 
become the active agents in the world economy and act as they have been taught is proper.  
The grand illusion of philosophy and anthropology alike, is that of the writer, the author 
with a clear plan of what they want to write. The results may be problematic and in need of 
interpretation but some are more needy than others (examples abound, ranging from those 
beloved of speech act theorists ‘I bet you’, through jokes ‘A horse walked into a bar…’ to 
poetry: ‘Should lanterns shine the holy face, caught in an octagon of unaccustomed light, would 
wither and any boy of love look twice before he fell from grace’ (Dylan Thomas)). It is a deeply 
misleading mistake to claim that all texts are the same. All utterances are not equally 
problematic: the young child whining for food does not pose as complex an interpretative 
                                                           
10 See Eisenstein (1979, 1997), Ong (1988) and Goody (1977, 1986, 1987) and Zeitlyn 2001 for an overview. Street 
(1983) and Finnegan (1988) provide corrections to the more overstated versions of the ‘great divide’. 
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challenge as, for example, the public relations officer acting for a television celebrity. So too, 
some social generalisations are much easier to make than others. We can be much more 
confident that we have, for example, identified the economic basis of a given society than we can 
be about their attitudes to life after death.  
Some authors have proposed ‘positioning theory’ as an alternative to various candidate 
theories of the self. Much of the difference between  positioning theory and its rivals lies in its 
abandonment of any attempt at essentialising the sense of self in ways parallel to Strathern’s 
ideas of partiable persona. So Linehan and McCarthy write ‘we define ourselves with respect to 
communities of practice as identity is constructed through negotiation of the meanings of our 
experience of membership in communities’ (2000: 438).  Selfhood on this account is not an 
individual attribute but a social accomplishment. Similarly, I am proposing that meaning lacks 
any essential core, that words really are as Wittengenstein said they were: what we do with them 
(and that such actions are not a matter for individuals in isolation: all actions are social actions, 
see Csordas 2004 and Das 1998). To look beyond, or to feel as if that is inadequate, is a literate 
illusion, foisted on the intellectual world by authors who mistake the written word for words 
spoken in conversation (de Certeau 1988). It is less the case that ‘in the beginning was the word’ 
than ‘in the beginning was the exchange of words’. Meaning is a social achievement not an 
individual assertion. This has wider implications: Descartes had it wrong, rather than cogito ergo 
sum we should have disputamus ergo summus.11 In his recent reflection on the anthropology of 
religion, Clifford Geertz called this the ‘autonomy of meaning thesis’ which he summarized thus:  
Meaning is not a subjective matter, private, personal, ‘in the head’. It is a public and 
social one, something constructed in the flow of life. We traffic in signs en plain air, out 
in the world where the action is; and it is in that trafficking that meaning is made. We 
must ... ‘mean what we say’, because it is only by ‘saying’ (or otherwise behaving, 
acting, proceeding, conducting ourselves, in an intelligible manner) that we can ‘mean’ at 
all.  (2005 :6) 
Relatedly, although making a different point, Sperber (1982) talks of semi-propositional 
representations, grammatical expressions that do not have the quite same propositional force as 
                                                           
11 In a similar argument Gergen contends that ‘we may rightfully replace Descartes’s dictum with 
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others. The propositional force that they may have does not depend on the attitude of the 
speaker but on the reception of their words by their interlocutors. It is not so much that I express 
my ability to transform into a hippopotamus as what others do with those words. I may say that 
I am a good farmer, and that I can transform into a hippopotamus. The status of these utterances 
is determined by whether I am invited to work parties, whether people come to visit me to 
inspect me for wounds when a hippopotamus is known to be sick or wounded and whether I am 
accused of trampling fields in hippopotamus form. So the status of these utterances is not 
determined by what the speaker intends or what by any one listener understands, but by what 
happens following the utterance. This has profound implications: the status cannot be safely 
established in advance (except by induction from previous utterings) and it is conditional on the 
conditions of utterance, the audience and circumstances in which the phrase is uttered. In short, 
the meaning is determined post hoc, after the event.  This, at a stroke, removes or avoids the 
philosophical topic of ‘the problem of meaning’ or ‘the’ problem of meaning (the difference in 
emphasis points to the possibility of different approaches, and to the possibility of a resolution 
of the problem). 
The ethnomethodological solution to the problem is to abandon the philosophers’ quest 
for certainty, the logicians’ quest for decidability, the computational linguists’ quest for an 
algorithm.  Instead, in an alarmingly empirical fashion, we examine everyday behaviour and 
focus on the way that utterances in ordinary, everyday usage are taken to be meaningful.  Most 
of the time most of us succeed in getting our meaning across.  If we accept this, and take it as 
our object of study then we abandon the search for MEANING (as it were in capitals) and 
examine instead the everyday adequacy of lay understanding.  This, of course, is anathema to 
many philosophers and to some anthropologists.  In everyday conversation utterances are 
satisfactory; they are sufficient to the day.  Such ‘practical adequacy’ for the task at hand 
provides ample matter for the analyst. The results of this style of analysis are widely applicable, 
and in particular are germane to the central topics of anthropology.  The result is a 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
communicamus ergo sum’ (1994: viii). 
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philosophically insubstantial but workaday anthropology.  Crucially, it is one that is oriented to 
the phenomena that surround us in fieldwork. This holds whatever the main focus of field 
research, be it beer, jiggers (or other health problems), farming, sexual politics, tarot cards, in-
vitro fertilisation, virtual reality or whatever currently fashionable topic we may care to choose. 
For what distinguishes anthropology12 from other humanities, above all else, is the practice of 
fieldwork. Unlike the study of literature or history, anthropological research consists, in the 
main of a series of partial but unceasing conversations, reflections upon them in the light of both 
what we see to have happened, and what happens next, as well as upon the theory we may glean 
from books (q.v. Gudeman and Rivera 1990). It is worth noting a further consequence of this is 
that researcher and research-subject are inextricably connected. 
What constitutes an ethnomethodological approach to meaning?  It begins with a very 
Wittgensteinian account of the use of the words at issue.  Perhaps, one sees something happen 
and wishes to find out more.  Or one may start with an elicitation frame and try and gather the 
vocabulary of a particular domain.  Then, given the clues that this reveals, one can examine the 
situations in which those words or phrases are used.  Of course, as anthropologists, we may be 
sensitive to issues about who uses particular words and the social context of their usage. To go 
further we look for problems, disputes and communicational upsets. We examine the troubles 
and see how they are resolved. Indeed this takes us from the 60s to the 70s and beyond.  For the 
notion of repairs is central to the ethnomethodological programme (Schegloff 1977, 1992).  
Meaning is assumed, presumed, taken for granted.  We work on that basis until we are given 
reasons to doubt (such as occur when there is a break in conversation) which leads to our 
explicitly addressing meaning and understanding.  During conversational repairs meaning is 
publicly negotiated between co-conversants.  Following the steps taken to effect repairs, those 
involved have further grounds for their assumptions, which may not be questioned at the next 
                                                           
12 Following Tim Ingold’s 2007 Huxley lecture, I should add a caveat to this. Ingold argues strongly for 
anthropology as a comparative discipline, comparing the results of individual ethnographies. The logic of his 
argument is that I should say ethnography (rather than anthropology) is distinguished by the practice of fieldwork.  
However, the experience of undertaking an ethnographic study remains a foundational qualification for professional 
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conversational round.  Those grounds are practically adequate to the task at hand.  Meaning is 
emergent from the morass of social activity and, in particular, it may be examined when 
problems occur.  So anthropologists really are, or should be, looking for trouble.  Not just the 
extreme areas of asking ‘what do you mean’ but the points where disputes arise about the 
correct course of a ritual, or who should inherit a particular field or cows.  Trouble spots are 
points at which meaning is at issue.  The result, the resolution of the problem is some sort of 
(more or less temporary) consensus, a means of proceeding, even if it is nothing more than an 
agreement to disagree. 
From this perspective meaning is an emergent phenomena of social interaction. On this 
view it is not located in our heads but in socially constructed space, in the interactions of social 
actors, of people (see Geertz 2005 quotes above).  More importantly, it serves to orient our 
research practice to troublesome but mundane interaction but now we can see why it has been so 
productive. To take an example from the study of ritual, consider Gilbert Lewis’s (1986) 
transcript from a recording made during the construction of part of the Gnau Panu’et ritual. The 
recording documents dissent about how the rite should be conducted. Through Lewis’s analysis 
the conflicting voices give substance to our understanding of the rite and its meaning. Another 
example, in a more mundane setting, concerns the neighbouring farmers, Sid and Doris as 
discussed by Nigel Rapport (1983). Rapport portrays them as constructing their relationship as 
they go about their everyday business. On my view, the anthropologist is handicapped by having 
less evidence to work on than the participants, but it is evidence of the same kind as used by Sid 
and Doris in constructing their representations of each other. The anthropologist has neither 
analytic nor authorial priority and the possibility of criticism is reintroduced if enough material is 
published.  
Much human interaction is unproblematic and not discussed. This can pose problems for 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
anthropologists and this justifies the distinction as stated. 
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analysts since it is never unambiguously clear what was meant or achieved.13 Hence, our 
concern for smaller or larger troublespots where conflicting voices may give substance to our 
understanding. Troublespots, disputes and arguments are among the places where ‘the 
everyday’ and ‘practical adequacy’ diverge. In mundane, unproblematic life the terms cover the 
same ground in which children are fed and raised, crops grown, livelihoods achieved. 
Arguments reveal discrepancies between the understandings of the different parties about what 
is going on. Resolution marks an agreement (often tacit, and temporary) of a common workable 
understanding. It must be workable in order to let people keep working at their shared social 
lives.14 Disputes set limits for the possible interpretations of the case in point15 and demonstrate 
in public the evolution of the interpretation that was achieved.  Life goes on and this includes 
the talk and arguments that are part of it.  The interpretations in question are first and foremost 
local, and may never be stated in words. They may also be those of an academic anthropologist, 
striving to make explicit the range of options within which social actions occur. This is what 
makes anthropological descriptions thick (in Ryle’s sense (1971) as adopted later by Geertz): 
not just the action but the way in which it is understood locally. 
This is to suggest that all utterances have degrees of illocutionary force, but the 
assessment of their power cannot be done in advance. This is easiest to see in arguments in court, 
where the parties involved are trying to convince those hearing the case that they should prevail. 
In the course of an argument many statements are made, most of which are never pursued and 
whose status is never established. Afterwards only the analyst really cares about these ‘loose 
ends’. The usual state of affairs is that the world is constituted by a mass of talk, most of which is 
somewhat vague. But in the jargon of ethnomethodology it is “practically adequate to the task at 
                                                           
13 On which both much fiction but also psychoanalysis rests. 
14 This is not to assume that ‘the everyday’ is a stable universal category: it is locally defined by what requires 
comment and explanation, the social equivalent of the unmarked case in linguistics.  In an extreme case, in a Tibetan 
Buddhist monastery as studied by Liberman (2004) debate and argument is part of the everyday! 
15 As illustrated over the longue durée by Bloch’s examination of Merina circumcision ritual in ‘From Blessing to 
 15 
 
hand” and that is sufficient for ordinary speakers. It should then also be sufficient for the analysts 
but this has not been the case, because, in large measure, the analysts have been beguiled by texts 
which have very different properties from the spoken words of conversation. Conversational 
utterances are both the ephemera of everyday life and its most basic constituents.  
My base proposition is that any/every utterance is provisional, pending its reception, so at 
the time of utterance there is no fixed meaning despite retrospective claims to the contrary. This 
has profound implications for philosophy and anthropology alike. For example, the privilege/ 
priority of the speaker having unique access to what they really mean must go, and once this 
solipsistic pressure is removed a far more democratic anthropology results. This provisionality is 
another form of the partiality or incompleteness that was discussed above as merological 
anthropology. We may be able to achieve confidence in our results, but speaking strictly, we can 
never be certain. Our knowledge even of the meaning of our own utterances is always 
incomplete, or partial. 
If we allow that, for example, Marilyn Strathern’s ideas of partible persona (see below) 
are a perfectly sensible way of organising the world, and if we also hold that our analytic 
vocabulary should at least aspire to universality, then anything not consistent with partiality 
should be eschewed by our analytic terms-of-art. My contention is that not only partible people 
but also the universality of conversational structure have implications inconsistent with many 
philosophical positions. Most of my readership will have been raised in the European/ North 
American cultural and philosophical tradition. What I am seeking to do in this paper is to render 
problematic some common assumptions. This leaves the options of either re-examining those 
ideas and, as it were, redoing the philosophy or of abandoning them in favour of a new and 
different type of philosophy. A benefit of raising these questions is that it makes (anthropology 
and) human life possible in a way that is understandable by social analysts.  
The ethnomethodological argument is that conversational structure makes meaning a 




post-hoc, shared achievement. Meaning is public and social, not interior, private, and prior to 
utterance. A consequence of this is that the main western philosophical program based on 
intentions (and actions following from them) is misguided (despite our schooled intuitions to the 
contrary). Why is this? Conversational success sediments meaning out of the wide range of 
possible outcomes. Meaning is achieved post hoc and you, the speaker, discover what you meant 
at the time of utterance along with your co-conversants. A similar argument can be made for 
goal-driven behaviour. Intentions, like meanings, are realised only after the fact. They cannot 
then be used to explain those actions.  The way we approach goal-directed behaviour needs a 
new analytic language. 
On the conventional view intentions are language-like. One intention differs from another 
in the same way that one word differs from another; by virtue of its meaning, so the intentional 
objects are the meaning of words. For example, how do you know I am thirsty? Because I act, 
for example, by saying ‘I am thirsty’ or ‘Mì né méh núá’ or by silently pouring a glass of water 
and drinking it. I open my mouth and utter or I open my mouth and drink (sometimes one before 
the other). The argument about meaning and conversation applies ipso facto to intentions and 
actions. Actions are public and social and through them we (and others) learn what we term ‘our 
intentions’ are or were. So though I am happy with the idea of goal directed action I’m not sure if 
the way we act is best characterised by a meaning driven vocabulary of analysis.  
Consider Marilyn Strathern’s ideas of Partial/Partible People (1992a). Strathern paints a 
fragmentary picture in which social relationships constitute individuals (dividuals), in which 
through a mesh of relationships a person comes into being (and changes as that mesh changes). 
So Strathern questions the western philosophical tradition of the individual and hence the 
Cartesian program. You can be certain that you exist but not that you are the same person as 
existed yesterday let alone a few years ago. As mortuary prohibitions make clear, as the 
generations change, you are changed: in some Australian groups the spoken lexicon is or was 
radically changed for years following a death so as to avoid uttering syllables that formed part of 
the deceased kins-person’s name. 
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Strathern’s approach has other philosophical implications: if there isn’t a constant 
persisting individual then there cannot be goal directed behaviour as has classically been 
portrayed by philosophers in the western tradition. It is one thing to say that ‘I am thirsty’ or 
stride across a room to get some water. Its quite another to do the long term planning that other 
goals imply. Yet that is exactly what PNG Highlanders are doing when arranging their pig feasts 
and ceremonial exchanges. So despite the lack of persisting individuals (the holders of 
intentions) that western philosophy assumes and which Strathern puts into question, the 
planning occurs.  The planning and strategizing of Ongka as he planned his big Moka (Nairn 
1976) provides a very clear demonstration that goal orientated behaviours occurs… But this is 
now a new problem since the basic units (individuals) the holders of intentions and goals have 
gone. What we need is a new analytic vocabulary or approach to intentionality.16  
Partibility is not the same as partiality but they are related. If people are partible then our 
knowledge of others can only be partial; always and necessarily incomplete. We know only 
some parts of the people we deal with, so our knowledge of them is incomplete. Even when 
dealing with those I know best such as my own children, I change as they change so the 
memories of their early years are, on Strathern’s account, those of a different composite person, 
not identical with me. My current access to memories of those babies is partial because of both 
the frailties of memory and the way the memory holder, the remembering self, has changed.  
The future of realism. Accounts, Warrants, Interests: Epistemologies for a twenty-first 
Century Anthropology. 
A stereotype for our time pits (male) scientific realism against (female) post-modern 
                                                           
16 This parallels the problems, flagged above, of taking an author’s plans for the text they write as a model for 
speakers and utterances. If both meaning and intention must be changed how can they be squared with our own 
experience as intentional beings? To answer this needs more than another paper in itself. I think the answer lies in 
different degrees of precision and vagueness. Ongka may, from the outset, intend to organise a big Moka. However, 
this does not imply that he then has a prior commitment to the specfic subsequent actions entailed by that intention. 
We may specify our gaols in advance but then work out the details in the middle of the actions that strive to obtain 
those goals.  
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interpretation. Life may be more fun (relaxed, unconstrained) as a post-modern relativist but 
readers will not be surprised that I side with dour empiricists for all the problems that this entails. 
As I hope I can explain, the arguments used against realism in the end serve to endorse it.  This is 
both at the level of basic ontology17 and as an important social myth which serves as an orienting 
impulse for anthropology or as a guide to a mode of life. As anthropologists we should recognise 
the importance of these things in the social system under description and recognise it as our own. 
In short, without the impulse or desire for accurate description there’s no point in continuing, 
there is nothing to debate. 
That said, it is not straightforward, which is both the problem and what makes it so 
interesting. This also explains why versions of this debate do not go away. As the Social Studies 
of Knowledge, Technology and Science (henceforth STS) have shown, even hard science is, at 
least in part, a social construct with its own patterns and forms of politics, ideology and policing. 
Recognising this doesn’t commit us to a profound relativism. I note parenthetically that 
relativism is only worth arguing about if it is profound: methodological relativism and 
symmetrical accounts of success and failure as pioneered by STS are old hat in anthropology 
(see e.g. Latour 1996). It comes down to Rorty’s claim that ‘there are no interesting differences 
between the aims and procedures of scientists and those of politicians’ (1991:172). I disagree. I 
think that the resistances or recalcitrance of the world (however construed) as acknowledged 
even by stalwarts of STS as Knorr-Cetina (1995: 148) are important. An (any) account of the 
                                                           
17 While this paper was being refereed an ontological breakthrough was announced (Henare, Holbraad and Wastell 
2007). The authors argue for a different approach to objects and anthropology which they characterise as 
ontological, contrasting with the epistemological stance of traditional approaches. However, the distinction of the 
object of knowledge from what is known remains; the issue of representation is inescapable. Their way evades the 
problem by denying the distinction: they seek to conceive of new worlds. They invite us to consider new thought-
objects in which things straightforwardly are meanings rather than possessing meanings, and hence there are no 
objects to be represented in thought since their meanings simply exist as part of their being. This is provocative and 
intriguing but, in my opinion, fails to convince. Their solution takes us from one set of problems to another: their 
approach reinstates incommensurable world views (ontologies) without any way of moving between them, like 
Leibnitzian monads without God to correlate them). They are no ways of deciding how many ontologies there are or 
can be: does a society contain just one ontology or are there different ones for males, females, old young, initiates 
and non-initiates? This descends into solipsism too fast for comfort. Without comparison and discussion between 
worlds we cannot be in a position to gain the insights to enable us to move between them. So having taken us to 
ontologies we return again to epistemological problems: representation again. 
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world which writes out the efficacy of antibiotics as purely ideological is less interesting, less 
worthy of debate than one which looks at the way the efficacy of antibiotics has been played out 
by all the interested parties (commercial copyright owners and scientists among them). To take a 
less controversial subject let me return to what Rom Harré calls Lenin’s rule: ‘the best 
explanation of empirical success is the truth’. The problem for relativist deconstructivists is the 
connection between accounts and action, which elsewhere they celebrate (e.g Potter 1996). As 
Fischer put it ‘the temptation of turning all accounts of science into the status of mere 
storytelling must be resisted: the chemical effects of drugs, or the geometry of the earth, or the 
physics of the atmosphere are not just stories’ (2003: 213 my emphasis). What I have in mind is 
the relationship of atomic physics to commonplace mass-produced objects such as fluorescent 
light bulbs, and in particular the processes of their manufacture. On the basis of C19th physics 
we can calculate the average distance between gas molecules at different temperatures and 
pressures. By adding some work from early C20th physics about energy states and radiation we 
can calculate the distance that an electron must travel if it is to excite the atoms it collides with, if 
the collisions are to knock the molecule into a higher energy state from which it will jump back 
down by emitting energy in the form of UV. The result of all this old-fashioned school physics is 
to explain both why the gases in fluorescent tubes are at low pressure (to increase distances 
between collisions so they are sufficiently energetic) and why the tubes have fluorescent coatings 
(to convert the UV radiation emitted to visible light). The point of this excursion is to point to the 
industrial/ manufacturing implications of some physics. The undoubted interestedness of the 
accounts may affect whether factories get built (or not built if the technologies are suppressed, as 
parodied in Alexander Mackendrick’s 1951 film ‘The Man in the White Suit’) but not the 
processes involved. There are resistances beyond our control as manifested in the problems of 
breathing underwater or in the jumping from windows rhetoric examined by Edwards, Ashmore 
and Potter 1995). That this is an interested, rhetorical point does not rob it of all its force or 
persuasiveness. 
If we loose sight of the resistances (from the world out there) then our accounts become 
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disoriented, uncritical and not themselves capable of critical scrutiny. As Gilbert Lewis puts it: 
‘sceptical theories of knowledge and philosophies of pervasive doubt, unqualified as to domain, 
or limit, or degree, seem designed to offer the strong relativist or the deconstructivist grounds for 
doing nothing, for detached contemplation’ (2000: 14). 
What is missed is any room for causation and intention, however hard these are to 
discern, however imperfect and tentative our understanding of these may be. What is at issue is 
the recalcitrant world and how we inhabit it. If we stress the interestedness of all accounts we are 
in danger of loosing sight of the central, causal nexus which we are trying to comprehend, and if 
sometimes the causality is unclear then that shouldn’t distract us from the easy cases. Causality 
can explain Stump’s (1996) defence of experimentation (as partially disconnected from 
particular theories) and answer Rorty’s charge. In other words, the interesting epistemological 
difference between ‘the aims and procedures of scientists and those of politicians’ is the kind of 
causality at issue. The Titanic may have sunk because of commercial interests that led to the 
skimping of safety features during construction, the overselling of safety in the marketing, the 
under-crewing and over speeding granted a given course and time of year. But to accept all of 
these is not to reduce to zero the role of the iceberg.18 
At the end of his book (1996) Jonathan Potter refrains from giving a conclusion. He sees 
this as empowering and leaving the reader with the problems of representation that realism will 
not make go away. I see it as an abdication of responsibility. The ‘Social Construction of Facts’ 
does not oblige us to be relativists, nor make realism impossible, just harder. For anthropology 
this is scarcely news. We have been worrying about the terms of our representations for 
generations, and we know that a term taken in one context may not be appropriate in another 
(consider the term ‘family’ as an example). Facts like icebergs are unpopular.  They are 
constructed yet can be obstinate or recalcitrant.  All in all better done without. That way elegant 
                                                           
18 Michael M.J. Fischer who is usually classed as an anthropological postmodernist expresses a similar sentiment 
when discussing the autobiographies of scientists: ‘the temptation of turning all accounts of science into the status of 
mere storytelling must be resisted: the chemical effects of drugs, or the geometry of the earth, or the physics of the 
atmosphere are not just stories.’ (Fischer 2003: 213). 
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theorising can proceed unabated, it may even be poetic. If talking of facts is seen as dinosaur-like 
it may be worth recalling that not all dinosaurs suffered extinction. Indeed, several contemporary 
biological families are actually direct descendants of dinosaurs.  To push the metaphor somewhat 
further, I am trying to trace evolutionary patterns where a sophisticated empiricism can emerge 
in 21st century anthropology. 
The results of STS as well as other epistemological concerns imply that there are 
problems with warrants for knowledge. It is not easy or straightforward to know how the world 
is or to be in a position to make statements about it. Some may conclude that if the world exists 
then it is essentially unknowable; we are essentially monadic without the help Leibniz could take 
from God to correlate our perceptions with the world. This way lies solipsism and quietism: there 
is no world to act on so no actions to undertake. 
Rather than agree with such pessimistic but consistent conclusions, I would start with 
intersubjectivity and different people giving different accounts. People and interaction are prior 
(primitive in the logical sense), meaning secondary. The question we then have to answer is why 
we would give any one account more credence than another. Some say they should be trusted 
because their statement is underwritten by a deity. Others say their statement is underwritten by 
other deities. Others again say it’s common sense, that it’s obvious to all right thinking folk. 
Among yet other explanations are a) explanation by interests ‘They would say that wouldn’t 
they?’ (either of an individual or social class/ gender/ company/ institution etc) or b) warranted 
by experience. A sub-type of this may be labelled science (with a small s) where active attempts 
are made to find out more about what’s going on (versions of empiricism).   
None of these are exclusive but they are cumulative. When an interested account also has 
empirical warrants it is importantly different from an account whose warrants are only interested. 
In a similar fashion, Lakoff and Johnson see ‘convergent evidence’ as providing the possibility 
of realism without denying the social determination of individual results (1999: 81-90 contra. 
Hastrup 2004: 450-60). It should be noted that the position I am describing is a form of what Roy 
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Bhaskar has called ‘critical realism’.19 Interested accounts are, of course, partial accounts, so this 
form of realism forms the basis for merological anthropology.   
Traps for thought 
As a way of moving towards a conclusion I now present some reflections on three traps 
for thought. 
1) The Anthropometric principle: constraints on possibility  
In astrophysics the anthropometric principle is used to establish constraints on boundary 
conditions, setting the range of possible values of important physical constants. The fact of our 
existence allows us to infer quite a lot about how the universe is structured. This is far from 
everything but something nonetheless, and can be done with confidence. Importantly, we can 
eliminate many possible values for boundary conditions, eliminating all universes lacking stable 
stars where planets with atmospheres do not form. There are sociological and anthropological 
versions of this: for example, the truism that unstable societies do not survive. It remains the case 
that most anthropologists study societies with sufficient stability to maintain languages over 
generations. For all the demonstrable acceleration of change through the Twentieth Century there 
remain very important sociological continuities between the beginning and end of the century 
even in countries such as USA, Japan and those of Northern Europe. Another set of boundary 
conditions relate to our physical selves. The human animal must feed and reproduce. On this 
perspective, the domains of physical, biological and genetic anthropology set the scene for, and 
hence constrain the domain of social anthropology. No social system incapable of sustaining 
human life will persist and hence be available for study. Famously, the original Shakers did not 
                                                           
19 See Bhaskar 1989 and Lewis 2000. Porter 1993 and Steinmetz 1998 discuss applications of the idea in the social 
sciences. Highmore (2007) has recently argued for a different form of middle ground between realism and relativism 
based on the work of Michel de Certeau leading him to agree with Donna Haraway: ‘The alternative to relativism is 
partial, locatable, critical knowledges sustaining the possibility of webs of connections called solidarity in politics 
and shared conversations in epistemology. Relativism is a way of being nowhere while claiming to be everywhere 
equally. The ‘equality’ of positioning is a denial of responsibility and critical enquiry. Relativism is the perfect 
mirror twin of totalization in the ideologies of objectivity; both deny the stakes in location, embodiment, and partial 
perspective; both make it impossible to see well.’ (1991: 191 quoted Highmore (2007:17)). 
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reproduce, believing sex to be sinful. We cannot study a Shaker community today because there 
are none. At the risk of tautology it should be recognised that we can study other groups with un-
sustainable beliefs but not over the long term. 
2) Causation and probability20 
One of the hardest ideas to come to terms with is that of probability and the lack of determination 
in sub-atomic physics, co-existing with our lived experience of a world of hard realities in which 
actions have clear consequences. A cloud of electrons will behave in a precise, predictable 
fashion, yet this is to talk about the crowd not the individuals that comprise it (there are gestalt 
effects). We cannot predict what any single electron will do. However, because we are animals 
whose bodies are the scale they are, we consciously interact with objects sized from millimetres 
to metres but typically not much smaller and not much bigger. At these scales quantum 
indeterminacy does not apply, we are only dealing with clouds of atoms, molecules and so forth, 
never single ones. Yet there are parallels to quantum indeterminacy in everyday life, why some 
people win the lottery and others do not, why only one of a pair exposed to a virus fell ill, why 
some people missed a plane that subsequently crashed.21 To say it is chance is unsatisfactory yet 
that’s what we are left with. Zande have a more satisfying explanation: the second spear, the 
ultimate cause of an event (achieved through witchcraft). As Evans-Pritchard explains (1937), 
for Zande there are no chance occurrences. The writer Stanislaw Lem, working somewhere 
between the genres of science fiction and the detective story, has summarized the problem in the 
novella ‘The Chain of Chance’ (1981).  
Now in trying to determine the a priori probability of such a coincidence, we find it 
impossible to offer a rational, that is to say, mathematically valid explanation. ... When it 
comes to unique and statistically unclassifiable events, the theory of probability is 
inapplicable (1981: 297).  
                                                           
20 This section alludes to but can in no-wise do justice to a complex and long established topic in the 
philosophy of science, as summarized by Wesley Salmon (1998) who even uses some examples from 
anthropology. 
21 In late 2006 it was reported in the media that the ‘random play’ function of Apple’s Ipod has been modified 
because users refused to believe it was picking songs randomly. The new procedure picks tracks non-randomly to 
achieve a pattern which we experience as random (in which multiple tracks from the same singer are unusual). 
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In this story a detective is sent to try and uncover a set of mysterious deaths that have little in 
common apart from their bizarre behaviour in the hours before their death in a seaside resort in 
southern Italy. In the end, the investigator, despairing of his task and about to quit, replicates the 
circumstances and almost dies in the process.   
According to the author the investigator suffered from ‘the classic dilemma of every 
investigation into the unknown. Before its limits can be defined the agent of causality must be 
identified, but before the agent of causality can be identified one must first of all define the 
subject under investigation’ (1981: 278). When considering a single event the probabilities do 
not help us, for this is what happened (no matter how unlikely). We live in a single world 
continuous with our past and also our future uncertain though that may be.22  Multiple parallel 
universes may well be a good way to think about the overall picture of how quantum 
indeterminacy produces determined outcomes at scales we experience. But even this is not 
enough to cope with the causal universe of experience. Perhaps this is the reason that too much 
stress on negotiation and construction seems misplaced: we live in a world in which things 
happen, and in which one thing leads to another. We can and do argue about what these are, but 
by and large, our arguments do not affect the things happening. We are patients more than we are 
actors. This a humbling conclusion for practitioners which should lead to a modest (partial) 
anthropology. 
3) Hindsight and the equal treatment of possibilities23 
In his study of a failed public transport project (Aramis) Latour (1996) provides a salutary 
warning about the dangers of the ‘sociology of hindsight’: 
No one can study a technological project without maintaining the symmetry of 
explanations. 
If we say that a successful project existed from the beginning because it was well 
conceived and that a failed project went aground because it was badly conceived, we are 
saying nothing. We are only repeating the words ‘success’ and ‘failure,’ while placing the 
cause of both at the beginning of the project, at its conception. 1996: 78  
                                                           
22 Philip Pullman’s ‘His Dark Materials’ trilogy considers a universe in which an infinity of parallel universes exists 
and some people have the technology to move between them. 
23 This section is based on Zeitlyn 1997. 
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Suspicions about the history written by the victors is one of the ways that we have moved 
beyond functionalism.  One of the wonderful things explored by Latour is how after the event 
(here failure) everyone admits to private doubts which went along with the public statements of 
confidence which were used to justify the continuation of the project, engineers told managers 
that the practical problems were solvable, the managers told the politicians it could be done 
within budget and in reply the politicians told them that they wanted it done.  All now deny 
speaking sincerely.  But this is how consensus was reached, and one assumes similar processes 
were at work in other projects which have come to fruition, allowing the private doubts to be 
conveniently forgotten. Latour also takes us on an exhilarating ride examining the financial and 
political environment in which Aramis was developed. But this is not a context-explains-all 
account: 
The work of contextualising makes the connection between a context and a project 
completely unforeseeable. … Hence the idiocy of the notion of ‘pre-established context.’ 
The people are missing; the work of contextualisation is missing. The context is not the 
spirit of the times which would penetrate all things equally. Every context is composed of 
individuals who do or do not decide to connect the fate of a project  with the fate of the 
small or large ambitions they represent. ... No indeed, nothing happens by accident; but 
nothing happens by context either. 1996: 137-8 
For Latour the actors do the sociology not the analysts. Each actor has to understand the 
social (and physical) world they live in.  So the different players in the project can give accounts 
of all the other players.  Different ‘social physics’ are invoked to explain why so and so (an 
individual or a company, or a thing, a vital component of the machine was pushed or pulled into 
a certain behaviour. Latour encourages us to relish the ambiguity of ‘it wouldn’t work’ (could 
not or did not want to?). On a regular basis we attribute intentionality to non-intentional entities, 
which range from companies (where the attribution has a legal sanction) through nation-states to 
objects.  
The actors make sense of this morass of different, partial, partisan story telling. They 
have to. Latour’s sociological analysis is not an attempt to make sense of the project but merely 
follows that of the actors themselves. They have to construct enduring entities to which they can 
orientate themselves and their actions.  Entities such as the desires of the government funding 
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agency, what the Paris underground authority really wants, and the state of the computer system 
running the automated cars. ‘The interpretations offered by the relativist actors are 
performatives. They prove themselves by transforming the world in conformity with their 
perspective on the world. By stabilizing their interpretation, the actors end up creating a world-
for-others that strongly resembles an absolute world with fixed references points’ (p 194-5).  But 
the difference must be insisted upon and it is within that difference that social negotiation as an 
everyday continuing process occurs. The anthropological account follows after the fact, and 
attempts to square the circle by being fair to all sides including those who contradict one another. 
To do this we must be modest, not attempting to have the final word, and accepting the 
incompleteness of our knowledge. 
Conclusions 
Rather than aiming at universal scope, at completeness, I have more modest aspirations, I am 
attempting to work with theories that are explicitly incomplete, with the joins or possible 
junction points left showing as an invitation for collaboration and continuation, as a reminder of 
the work that remains to be done (hence the label ‘merological’).  Incomplete they may be, but 
just like the everyday understandings that underlie our everyday competences, the theories are 
adequate for the task-at-hand: the problems at issue. Perhaps I should be even more cautious and 
say rather that the theories are more or less adequate for the task-at-hand.  What I like about this 
style of approach is that it moves from a polarised contrast between True or False to a continuum 
of approaches ranging from the woefully inadequate to others found to be helpfully adequate, 
which Hastrup might call (2004) those that have ‘got it right’. However,  Hastrup confuses 
empiricism with positivism (2004: 468-9) and although she is implicitly critical of radical 
postmodernism24 she also sees it as freeing us from the shackles of ‘positivist thinking’. Yet 
without empiricism the idea of ‘narrative responsibility’ becomes vacuous or prone to endless 
                                                           
24 See Reyna (1994) for an extremely lucid account of the problems of interpretative anthropology in 
general, and p. 563 for discussion of positivism in particular.  
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ideological redefinition. Of course, we have no independent knowledge of the world independent 
of observation and interaction, but the world is recalcitrant, it is not entirely of our making – it is 
this point which is acknowledged even by those in the social studies of science school such as 
Knorr-Cetina (1995: 148) which points to the difference between Hastrup and me: on my 
account we are trying to comprehend an obdurate or recalcitrant world in which people live their 
lives as best they can, constrained (not determined) by the world and their understanding of it. 
Our comprehension is always partial, and uncertain but can be discussed and improved. We can 
assemble collages of different views, collating the different parts (even though there is no 
ultimate, perfect or complete view) and discuss different ways of summarizing them even though 
they may contain inconsistencies. There is a final irony to consider: despite the profound 
philosophical difference between us, our practice as field anthropologists may not be greatly 
different.  
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